To answer the question Will the collective regime and the
DIPR system proposed here protect the distribution of intellectual
products and compensate the creators? I found the paper 'A
Framework for Evaluating Digital Rights Management Proposals'
by Rachna Dhamija and Fredrik Wallenberg was a
valuable resource. They pose six questions that should be used when
evaluating rights management proposals. Below, I attempt to answer
these questions from the DIPR prospective although I will be the
first to admit that more research is
required in many areas.
Dhamija and Wallenberg accept that the information
contained in an intellectual product has the characteristics of
a 'public good'. The DIPR system described here attempts
to treat intellectual property as a public good and therefore avoids
all the problems associated with trying to make intellectual products
'excludable' or 'rival' as in most rights management systems. DIPR
also attempts to avoid the extremes of some other systems that treat
intellectual property as a public good. For example, DIPR does not
rely entirely on voluntary payments or arbitrary tax schemes. To
the contrary, DIPR adopts a regulated social scheme that allows
all parties to 'buy into' the public good.
Technically two sets of secure servers operating
a common protocol are required with appropriate user applications.
Both type of server would be issuing persistent identifiers. The
DOI is already issuing millions of persistent identifiers for intellectual
products and the DIPR system only expands this process. The Internet
already relies on strictly defined protocols to function correctly
and is the ideal environment to accept another peer-to-peer protocol
although additional standards for identifying all the different
file types would also have to be drawn up. Technically complicated
but feasibly. Obviously a study would be required to properly asses
the costs and impact of implementing the DIPR system.
There are no incentives to remove or tamper with the Property Rights Descriptors
(PRD) attached to the digital product - why remove a PRD and make
the product illegal when person in possession can just keep the
legally identified one? The temptation to attack or operate a Rights
Office in an illegal fashion would be great. Therefore maximum effort
should be directed towards protecting and regulating these offices
which is not an insignificant task but more feasible than regulating
every manifestation of an intellectual product.
Compliance falls to the authorities regulating the office structure and
monitoring third party abuse of registered products. Authors will
have a vested interest in operating a dependable set of Author
Rights Offices and consumers will have an equal interest
in dependable Consumer Rights
Offices to protect their access to their products. Each
type of Office verifies the actions of the other and it is this
dual independent structure that makes regulating the system so much
more feasible compared to a centralised system where one party has
a controlling interest.
The DIPR system is not directly concerned with the commercial transactions
each consumer only purchases the products they want directly
from the supplier. As mentioned in the main
document, the Office network could perform a banking function
to help the transfer of funds from consumer to author but this is
nothing like regulating some of the proposed tax or levy systems
for distributing a common set of funds.
and fair use are totally
assured. Please refer to the main text for a full discussion of
The principle question
here is whether regulation of all the Rights Offices throughout
the world is feasible? Because the persistent identifiers require
an international naming authority for the prefixes, which in turn
identify individual rights offices, a rouge office could be excluded
from the registry thus identifying all its PRDs as illegal. Even if the physical office, the server
or whatever, and its owners were based in a country unable to enforce
the rules directly the system would still work providing there is
an international consensus.